RECENT CASES.

COMMON CARRIERS.
Goods consigned to plaintiff by way of the defendant express
company, arrived at their destination, an unimportant station,
Expres
Companuks
As insurers

where the usage was to notify the consignee of
their arrival instead of personally delivering them.

The defendant's agent sent no notice to the
plaintiff. Plaintiff's goods were stolen the same day he would
have receivcd notice of their arrival, had any been sent. Held,
that as the negligence in not sending the notice was not the
proximate cause of the loss, the Court assuming that the consignee, because of the inclement weather, would not have gone
for the package had notice been sent, defendants are not liable.
Hutchison v. Express Co., 59 S. E., 949. An ordinary common
carrier is responsible for goods carried, only as warehouseman
after they have been at the point of destination a reasonable
time. Fenner v. R. R., 44 N. Y., 5o 5 . And some courts hold
that not even notice of the arrival by the common carrier to
the consignee is necessary. Norway Co. v. R. R., i Gray, 263.
Upon an express company, however, there is the duty laid of
personal delivery, and until such delivery it is held as insurer.
American E.rprcss Co. v. Wolf. 79 Ill., 430. This duty may be
di.pensed with by custom and usage at unimportant stations
anl replaced by the duty of mere notice to the consignee; but
the express company is held strictly liable to give such notice
in order to be relieved of its liability as insurer. Witbeck v.
Holland, 45 X. Y., 13. As there was no notice given in the
principal case, irrespective of whether it would have been acted
on or not. it is submitted that the defendant was not relieved
of its liability as insurer, and the doctrine of proximate cause
on which the Court based its opinion should not have been considered at alL -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The personal representative of D brought an action in per[267]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).
sonain against B for the death of D in a collision on the high
Tort on
hisgh Sea:
LiabItState
Under
Statute

sea between the vessels of B and C, corporations
located in Delaware, a State statute of which permits such an action by the personal representative
llohnes, J., held, that such a
of the deceased.

statute is not repugnant to the admiralty or commerce clauses of the Federal Constitution, and will be enforced
as a case within the common law jurisdiction, which State
statutes may control in the absence of federal legislation on the
subject. Old Dominion Line v. Gihnore, U. S. Adv. Sheets,
Jan. 15, 1908, p. 133.
Such an action for a maritime tort under the State law was
doubted in Bttler v. Boston, 130 U. S., 527; but has been since
definitely established in The Corsair, 145 U. S., 336; McDonald
v. Mallory, 77 N. Y., 546; and the City of Norwalk, 55 Fed.

98 (N. Y.).
CONTEMPT.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island adjudged B in contempt for incorrectly publishing the decision of the Court, and
Pnblkation of
Deciion

making adverse criticisms thereon without dis-

paraging the integrity of the Court. B pleaded
that the misstatement was not intentional and the
criticism not on a cause then pending. The Court held, that as
the decision was far-reaching, such a misstatement could not be
published with impunity. In re, Providence Journal Co., 68 Atl.
428.
Under this opinion, there would appear to be liability for
any misstatement of the law whether made in the press or on
the forum, whether the cause be then pending or not. At common law, one might be adjudged in contempt (i) for scandalizing the Court itself; (2) for abusing the parties concerned in
the cause, or (3) for prejudicing mankind against persons
concerned before the cause is heard. Roach v. Garvean, 2
Athyns. 471. This common law doctrine has been followed in
some States, as in .Morrill's Case. i6 Ark., 384, and Burdett's
Case, 103 Va., 838; but the principal case can hardly be brought
within those cases.
The general American doctrine is that no matter how defamatory of the court or the judge a publication may be, it cannot
be regarded as contempt unless it be written and published with
reference to a cause then pending before the court. Ex parte,
Green, 81 S. W. (Tex.), 723; Felhman v. Mercantile, ii6 La.,
723;

Stuart v. People, 4 Ill., 395.
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CRIMINAL LAW.
The accused was informed against for robbery. - The information was insufficient to charge that offense, but did charge
larceny. lie was tried, convicted and sentenced
Form
for robbery. Held, the accused, having been once
Jeopard
in jeopardy for the offence of larceny under such
information, could not be again tried therefor after reversal
of the erroneous conviction of robbery. Court of Appeal of
California in People v. lo-Sing, 93 Pacific, 2o4.
In Floyd v. State, 96 S. W., 125 (Ark.), the defendant was
discharged on an indictment of robbery, because he had been
fined before a magistrate for petit larceny based on the same
facts. The Court say, "As a charge of robbery includes larceny," the defendant on the indictment of robbery would be on
trial for an offense -for which he had already suffered punishment.
In Bowen v. State, io6 Ala., 178, the indictment charged burglary, the jury found defendant guilty of larceny, the Court
reversed the finding, because of failure to allege ownership of
the property, but held he could be tried again for laiceny.

A was convicted and sentenced for the crime of obtaining
money by false pretenses in the United States Court in China,
Jurisdiction:
United StattS
Court
China for

i9o6. The
which was created by Act of June 30, against
the
Court has jurisdiction over offenses

are
laws of the United States, and when these
deficient to furnish suitable remedies, then -in ac-

cordance with the common law. Held, the statute 3o Geo. II
(1757), making this act a crime having been passed prior to
the separation of this country from England, is an offense at
common law within the meaning of the Act of i96; Biddle v.
U. S., x56 Fed., 759.
In several States, English statutes passed prior to July 4,
1776, have been*held to be in force.
In other States, only statutes passed prior to 4 James I
(i6o7) are considered as part of the common law. 6 Am. &
Eng. Encyc., 278 (2nd ed.).

DAMAGES.
In Beaulieu v. Great Northern Railway Company, 112 N. W.
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DAMAGES (Continued).
Rep., 353 (Dec. 27, 19o7), the Supreme Court of Minnesota
exhaustively reviews the subject of mental sufferMental
ing as an 'element of damage in actions arising
Suffering In
Tort and
cx delicto and e.r contractu, and cites the authorities in e.rtcnso. In this case the plaintiff's child
Contract
(lied at Cass Lake, and was shipped over the road of the defendant company to Ogahnah, where it was to be buried. It
was necessary to transfer the body to a connecting line at
Erskine. The defendant, however, carried the body past this
point, and as a result of the negligent act, the plans for the
funeral were delayed and the plaintiff suffered great mental
anguish. The Court held, that the acts complained of constituted a mere breach of contract, and not being accompanied
by any independent, wilful tort by the defendant, the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover except for nominal damages.
EQUITY.
The complainant had for years placed on the market under
the trade name of "Enterprise," a machine and its parts on
which the patent had expired. Ie had a general
reputation as the manufacturer of other articles
Unfair
compettion
Reil by
under that name. The defendants manufactured
parts of the same machine and packed them in
IRcfue
boxes similar to the complainant's marked: "Repair Parts of the Enterprise Meat Chopper" manufactured
by the defendants. There were no indicia on the parts to show
their origin. An injunction prohibiting the defendant from
making or selling the articles without distinguishing them from
the complainant's was refused; Bcnder v. Enterprise Co., 156
Fed., 641.
Relief is granted where the machine is simulated and placed
on the market with no differentiating marks. Singcr Mfg. Co.
v. Just Mfg. Co., 163 U. S., i69. This is on the ground of
the confusion caused among the public which results in a detriment to the plaintiff's established business. Flagg Mfg. Co.
v. Holway', 178 Mass., 83.
In Neostvlc Mfg. Co. v. Ellan's Duplicator Co., 21 C. P. C.,
185, an injunction was refused in a situation similar to the
present. The case nearest in point in America is Dcering Harvesting Co. v. I'aiitman, 91 Fed., 376, in which the parts were
advertised and catalogued as manufactured by the complainant. It is needless to add the defendant was restrained.
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EQUITY (Continued).
The Court in the present case refused a further extension
of the above case for the reasons: (i) that the assumption
ordinarily is not that the parts are manufactured by the maker
of the machine itself; (2) that to grant the complainant's prayer
in requiring the defendants distinctly to car-mark their product
would have a deterrent effect upon the trade in repair parts
FIXTURES.
A wrongfully attached B's two-roomn frame dwelling house,
which was then a chattel, to land belonging to A, and then
conveyed the land and house to C, who had no
Unawfl
Attach tt

notice of B's rights. Held, the house did not be-

come a part of the realty as between B. and C.
Supreme Court of Montana in Eisenhauerv. Quinn, 93 Pacific,
38.
'Most of the cases concerning fixtures in which the rights
of innocent purchasers have come in question, have been cases
where the chattel has been attached with the consent of its
owner under an agreement that it is to remain personalty. In
these cases an innocent purchaser of the realty is permitted
to retain the chattel against the owner. Bronson on Fixtures,
155 and cases cited. The contrary has been held, however;
Russell v. Richards, io Me., 429.
The ground of the majority view is that the owner of the
chattel has put it in the power of the owner of the realty to sell
it with the land to an innocent purchaser; Wicher v. Hill, it5
Mich., 333; Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt., 546.
The decision of the principal case where the attachment was
made without the consent or fault of the owner seems in accordance with this principle.
HABEAS CORPUS.
In ex parte Burden, 25 Southern Reporter i, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi, granted a writ of habeas corpus to a
prisoner who had been *sentenced as for a felony,
Attacking
Erroneus
under a verdict of "assault and battery with intent
to commit manslaughter," when there is no such
Judgustnt
crime known in the law, the words "with intent to commit manslaughter," which the trial Judge considered as indicating a
felony, being mere surplusage.
See note page 255.
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HOM ICIDE.
B, boarding with C, placed a spring-gun in his trunk in su.:h
a manner as to kill C who, in curiosity and without right,
sought to open the trunk, though warned by B as
~ Prt.um
to the condition. Held, that one has no greater
minQ:
Intent
right to take life by indirect than by direct means
under the same circumnstances; that warning to C was no defence to the charge of murder unless it were brought home in
such a way that her act was a deliberate attempt to take her
own life; but if C was the only person who might rightfully
go to the room, evidence of the warning is admissible as having a material bearing on the question of malice; that proof of
the specific intent not to kill C is not admissible, since his intent
was necessarily general until made specific by C's death, so
evidence of his intent must be equally general; State v. Mar-

faudille, 93 Pac. (Wash.), 939.
On the question of notice, this case goes beyond that held
in United States v. Gilliaw, Fed. Cases No. i52o5a, where it
was held, that where notice is given, -the sufferer is held to
have brought the calamity on himself-to be his own executioner if life is lost. The other doctrines of the leading case
are in line with the few cases which have arisen in America.
Wharton on Homicides, 4z8, 553; Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. x;
Gray v. Combs, 7 J. J-Marsh, 428.
The old English common law on this subject as declared in
Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Aid., 304, has not been adopted into the
common law of this country. State v. Moore, 31 Conn., 479.

INNKEEPERS.
Plaintiff, stopping at the "Imperial Hotel," at a summer resort, and the rate being fixed by the week, but for no specified
time, brings this action for property taken from
her room. Held, that defendant proprietor was an
Boardtng
innkeeper and liable to the plaintiff guest for any
K
Betweenin

tofor
Reard
Ilty
Liab

loss not induced by the latter's contributory negligence. Holstein v. Phillips, 59 S. E., 1o37. The

absolute liability of innkeepers for any loss not
occasioned by the contributory negligence of the
guest has long been settled. Bac. Abr. Inns and Innkeepers
C. 4. That there is a difference between a boarding house and
an inn and thlt the latter's proprietor is liable only for the

Theft
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INNKEEPERS (Continued).
losses occurring through his own negligence or that of his servants, is equally well e.tablished; Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod., 254.
An inn may quarter one as a "'boarder," and conversely a
boarding house may quarter one as a "guest ;" Kister V. Hildebrand, 9 B. 'Mon., 72, and in each case the liability of the proprietor is determined by the character of the resident. A place
is not conclusively an inn because it is called "hotel ;" Boncnr
v. il "lbron, 7 Ga., 296; nor is it conclusively a boarding house'
because the charge is made by the week; Betts v. Salisbury, 12
Alb., L. J.. 337. As the old reasons for holding innkeepers to
such strict requirements have passed away, and as the trend of
the law is to free them from the old liabilities, a case so closely
on the line as the principal case might well have gone the other
way.

NEGLIGENCE.
Defendant owned a pile of wood, one corner of wlhich extended over the highway, though not the travelled portion, for
about two feet, but there was left sufficient room
Highwaysin the highway for the ordinary use thereof.
Lfability of
Persons
While plaintiff's wife was driving along the road,
causing[
the horse became frightened by a train, and started
Obstruction
to run. When the wood pile was reached, the
buggy struck the part extending into the highway, and was
overturned, and plaintiff was thrown with such violence as to
cause her death.
There was held to be no error in the refusal of the Court to
instruct the jury that. as a question of law, the fact that the
wood pile was "off the main traveled portion of the highway
and at a place where it was not dangerous to persons driving
along said highway in the customary and ordinary manner,"
exculpated defendant from all blame and responsibility for the
accident and its consequence.; WI'illiants V. San Francisco &
Y. I'. Ry.Co., 93 Pac., 122.
While the cases appear to be widely dii'ergent upon the application of principles of law involved in the principal case, whatever apparent difference there may be in the conclusions
reached is founded upon a distinction made clear by the Court,
as follows: "And while, as between the town or county or
public authorities having supervision of public highways and
the traveler, the latter will leave the portion of the road laid
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NEGLIGENCE (Continued).
out and prepared for the customary use and travel, and go upon
and use the unprepared and customarily unused part at his
own risk, he is nevertheless entitled to the unobstructed and
uninterrupted use of the entire width of the highway as
against the unlawful acts of other persons, either real or artificial."
In Dickey v. Maine Telegraph Co., 46 Me., 485, it was held:
"The duty of others is to abstain from doing any act by which
any part-of the highway would become more dangerous to the
traveler than in a state of nature, or than in the state in which
the town has left it." In another case it was said, "It is a mistake to suppose the public rights of travel are restricted to the
prepared and usually traveled path." Johnson v. hIitfield, i8
Me., 286; 36 Am. Dec., 721.
There is a well recognized rule that an owner of property
abutting upon a road has a right temporarily to occupy a reasonable portion of the road with building materials, provided
that sufficient room is left for the passage of persons traveling;
Pahner v. Sihcrthorn, 32 Pa., 65. However, the justification
of such actions lies in necessity, an element not present in the
principal case; Smith v. Simnions, i03 Pa., 32.
Plaintiff was injured through the breaking of a "head-piece"
of an elevator which his employer was renting from the defendant. Plaintiff sues defendant for damages.
Persoas
There was no proof that defendant was bound to
Uable:
Liablllity
inspect and repair the elevator or that he was
Lessor
Of of
under any obligation beyond that of furnishing an'
Machin
elevator safe and suitable for the purposes to
which it was to be put. There was no evidence that the "headpiece" was defective or unsafe when installed. Recovery was
allowed in the lower court. Scott, J., in reversing the decision
because of error in instructions as to defendant's liability, said:
"It was undoubtedly the defendant's duty in the first instance
to furnish an elevator which was safe and suitable for the uses
to which it was to be put," but, "beyond this, in the absence
of a special agreement. it was under no obligation to inspect
or repair." Haigh v. Edclbnc'cr & Morgan Rod Elevator Co.,
io7 N. Y. Sup., 936.
This statement seems to infer that, had a contract existed
between the plaintiff's employer and the defendant, and there
had been a breach of contract by the latter in not properly
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NEGLIGENCE (Continued).
inspecting, the plaintiff could have recovered. This inference
accords with the dictum of the early New York ca.e of King
v. R. R., 6 N. Y., 181, decided in 1876, that. "Ifthere was
a duty resting upon the defendant (lessor) to keep the derrick
in repair, so that it could be safely used, it may be conceded
that the omission of this duty would give a right of .ction to
the plaintiff -,an employee of lessee) for an injurj' caused
thereby," thus showing that in New York the question of the
right of an employee of a lessee to recover from a lessor
damages for injuries resulting from breach of contract to inspect and repair machinery entered into by the lessor with the
lessee, is still an open one.
The general law is well established to the contrary, as laid
down in the kell-known case of I1interbottom v. IWright, 1o
M. & V., 107, and followed in the recent case of Earl v. Lubbock, i K. B., 253 (i9o5). These cases restrict the plaintiff's
action, in such a case as this, to one against his employer, holding that the contract between his employer and the lessor does
not entitle the employee of the lessee to an action against the
lessor.
Defendant, an operator of a stone quarry, was held liable in
damages for personal injuries resulting from negligence in not
properly inspecting the rocks blasted in the quarry
Master and
so as to prevent danger from unexploded charges
servant:
Dingrant
to workmen employed to reblast the rocks. The
DutyofMater defendant pleaded assumption of risk. The evidence showed that it was the rule in quarries that
the foreman should provide means by \vhich all unexploded
charges could be found-numbered-and exploded before the
workmen employed to reblast the rocks should begin work.
The plaintiff, being advised of this rule, worked in reliance
upon it, and was injured by the explosion of a hidden charge.
Harper v. Iola Portland Cement Co., Sup. Ct. of Kansas, 93
Pac., 179.
This case accords directly with Brick Co. v. Shanks, 69 Kansas, 3o6, in holding that "The defendant expressly undertook
to make the place wliere the plaintiff was required to work,
safe by the adoption of the regulation described. and an inplied agreement to assume the risk guarded by the regulation
cannot be recognized."
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POWERS OF POLICE DEPARTMENT.
The plaintiff was indicted -for grand larceny and forgery,
and while waiting in the district attorney's office for his
Bertlon

arraignment and release on bail, was directed by

the police department to submit to being photographed and having certain impressians and measments taken under the "Bertillion System." He
afterwards was arraigned and released on bail and now seeks
to regain such photograph and imprints by mandamus. Such
were the facts in Gow v. Bingham, io7 N. Y. Suppl., ioIx.
It was held that the act of the police department was unlawful as being a violation of the right of freedom andl the inviolability of the person; that it was contrary to the provision
of law that requires the arresting officer immediately to bring
the offender before the nearest sitting magistrate; and that
the act was not justified by the provision in the city charter
that it was the duty of the police to "especially preserve the
public peace, prevent crime and detect and arrest offenders,"
nor by the power of the police commissioner "to make such
rules, orders and regulations" as may be 'reasonably necessary
to effect a prompt and efficient exercise of all powers conferred
upon him by law. See Sec. 5i, Liedeman on State and Federal
Constitution; Joyce v. N. Y., 27 Misc. (N. Y.), 658, where the
plaintiff had been convicted and where the police department
was sustained; Owne v. Partridge,40 Misc. (N. Y.), 415, same
facts and decision as in preceding case, but it is intimated
that the result might be different if the plaintiff had not been
convicted; State v. Clausineircr, 154 Ind., 599, holding that
while a sheriff may take a photograph of a prisoner so that he
might more readily capture him in case of escape, the sending of such picture t6 the police department of another city
was a libel.
It was held, however, that although the defendants were
liable to civil action of damages, or criminal prosecution for assault or libel, the plaintiff had no remedy by writ of mandamus,
for "a .writ oi mandamus only lies to compel one to do what
ought to be done in discharge of a public duty, and not to undo
what is improperly done, even though it may be done under
color of the performance of a public duty." See also, Merrill
on Mandamus, Sec. 42; ex parte, Nast., x5 Q. B., 921; Dental
Society v. Jacobs, 92 N. Y. Supp., 59o.
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